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1 
Interests of Amicus Curiae 
The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (“Knight 
Institute” or “Institute”) is a non-partisan, not-for-profit organization that works to 
defend the freedoms of speech and the press in the digital age through strategic 
litigation, research, and public education. The Institute’s aim is to promote a system 
of free expression that is open and inclusive, that broadens and elevates public 
discourse, and that fosters creativity, accountability, and effective self-government. 
Amicus has a particular interest in this case because of the vital role social 
media platforms play as forums for public discourse. The statute challenged here is 
the first state law that seeks to constrain social media companies’ power to moderate 
speech on their platforms. The case may have far-reaching implications for the free 
speech rights of the platforms and their users, and for the ability of government to 
enact legislation essential to ensuring that the digital public sphere serves 
democracy.1  
 
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s 
counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the 
brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel contributed 
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. The parties have 
consented to the filing of this amicus brief.  
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 Statement of the Issues 
Whether the district court correctly enjoined S.B. 7072 because, among other 
things, Plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits of their First 
Amendment claim. 
Summary of the Argument 
S.B. 7072 (the “Act”) is unconstitutional because it is designed to punish 
certain social media companies, selected on the basis of perceived viewpoint, for 
their exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. The Court can resolve this 
case on this narrow and straightforward basis.  
Both the parties and some of their amici, however, have made further-reaching 
arguments about the application of the First Amendment to social media platforms. 
Florida’s brief suggests that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all, 
because the platforms do not engage in protected expression when they moderate or 
curate user content, and because the platforms should be viewed as common carriers. 
Plaintiffs’ brief, by contrast, construes platforms’ First Amendment rights in the 
broadest way, suggesting that any regulation that burdens their exercise of First 
Amendment rights should be subject to strict scrutiny, and perhaps even viewed as 
per se unconstitutional. In the court below, some amici advanced similar arguments. 
Thus, the parties and some amici have offered two theories of the First Amendment, 
one that would render the First Amendment largely irrelevant to the question of how 
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3 
governments should regulate social media, and another that would make it nearly 
impossible for governments to enact even carefully drawn laws intended to ensure 
that the digital public sphere serves democracy.  
As this brief explains, the courts need not choose between “all” or “nothing” 
in this sphere. Whether a particular activity is covered by the First Amendment in 
this context turns on whether the activity entails the exercise of “editorial judgment.” 
This label applies to some of the platforms’ activities, but it may not apply to others. 
Perhaps more important, even activities covered by the First Amendment can 
sometimes be regulated. Whether any particular regulation should be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny will turn on the nature of the regulation, and 
the mere fact that a regulation implicates editorial judgment does not mean the 
regulation is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs and some of their amici analogize social 
media platforms to newspapers—and this analogy is useful, to a point. But social 
media platforms and newspapers are different in important respects, and these 
differences should matter to the First Amendment analysis, as explained below.  
 If the Court addresses the parties’ further-reaching arguments about the 
application of the First Amendment to social media platforms, it should reject both 
Florida’s theory of the First Amendment (the “nothing” theory) and Plaintiffs’ 
theory (the “all” theory). It should reject these theories because they are inconsistent 
with controlling caselaw, but also because neither of them would serve First 
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4 
Amendment values well in the digital age. Florida’s version of the First Amendment 
would give the government sweeping authority over the digital public sphere and 
impede social media companies from addressing real harms online. Plaintiffs’ theory 
would make it difficult or impossible for governments to enact even carefully drawn 
laws intended to protect the free speech, due process, and privacy rights of platforms’ 
users and to ensure that our system of free expression serves democracy. Neither of 
these theories is defensible, and the Court should reject both of them.  
Argument 
I. Senate Bill 7072 is unconstitutional because it discriminates among 
social media platforms on the basis of viewpoint. 
As discussed further below, platforms engage in protected expression when 
they specify “community standards” that restrict what categories of content users 
can post, and when they remove or attach warning labels to user content. See Part 
II.B infra. The Act is unconstitutional because it is designed to punish certain social 
media companies, selected on the basis of perceived viewpoint, for expression 
protected by the First Amendment.  
That the Act is intended to achieve this end is made evident in a variety of 
ways. Perhaps most notably, the statutory definition of “social media platform,” 
which is a lynchpin, applies only to a subset of the largest social media companies, 
expressly excluding any such company under common ownership with a Florida 
theme park, an obvious reference to Disney. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(g). A statute 
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should not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny merely because it regulates only the 
largest companies—there are obvious reasons why legislatures might legitimately 
focus on the companies with the most influence over public discourse. Here, 
however, the definition of “social media platform” appears to have been 
gerrymandered to ensure that the Act’s burdens fall principally on platforms 
believed to have a liberal bias (e.g., Twitter and Facebook), and not on smaller 
platforms believed to have a conservative one (e.g., Parler and Gab), and not on 
Disney, which is not perceived to have a liberal bias and also has significant 
operations in Florida.  
As a result, the Act is underinclusive in reference to its declared purpose. The 
Act states that it is intended to prevent platforms from “unfairly censor[ing], shadow 
bann[ing], deplatform[ing], and appl[ying] post-prioritization algorithms to 
Floridians.” 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32 (S.B. 7072) (West). But the Act 
does not actually take aim at all social media platforms. The Act’s 
underinclusiveness “raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact 
pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or 
viewpoint.” Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011). Even 
“where . . . there is no evidence of an improper censorial motive,” Ark. Writers’ 
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987), a law is subject to strict scrutiny 
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if it is “structured so as to raise suspicion that it was intended to [interfere with 
protected speech].” Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991). 
The legislative history—detailed by Plaintiffs and the district court—confirms 
that the Act is indeed designed to punish social media platforms believed, rightly or 
wrongly, to have a liberal bias. Pls. Br. at 15; App. 1719-20. The Act therefore is 
permissible under the First Amendment only if it satisfies strict scrutiny. Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). It cannot survive this review. Indeed, 
Florida has not even asserted that the Act serves a compelling governmental purpose. 
If its purpose here is to eliminate the liberal bias of social media platforms, that is a 
“decidedly fatal” objective. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of 
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) (“produc[ing] speakers free of … biases” toward 
“certain classes” is not a legitimate government interest). Moreover, the Act’s under-
inclusiveness means the Act is not narrowly tailored to even that interest. For these 
reasons, the Act fails strict scrutiny.2  
II. The Court should reject a construction of the First Amendment that 
would disable the government from enacting legislation that serves First 
Amendment values. 
The Court can dispose of this case on the narrow ground described above. In 
their briefs, however, the parties advance broader arguments about the application 
 
2 Amicus takes no position here on whether S.B. 7072 is preempted by Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
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of the First Amendment to social media. Florida’s brief suggests that the Act does 
not implicate the First Amendment at all, because the platforms do not engage in 
protected expression when they moderate or curate user content, and because the 
platforms should be viewed as common carriers. Plaintiffs’ brief, by contrast, 
construes platforms’ First Amendment rights in the broadest manner, suggesting that 
any regulation that burdens their exercise of First Amendment rights should be 
subject to strict scrutiny. If the Court addresses these arguments, it should reject 
them. 
A. The First Amendment protects the exercise of editorial judgment.  
In an important series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
First Amendment protects the exercise of “editorial judgment.” In Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court invalidated a statute 
requiring newspapers that criticized political candidates to afford those candidates 
an opportunity to reply, in the newspapers’ own pages, free of charge and with equal 
prominence and space. 418 U.S. at 244 & n.2. The Court concluded that the statute 
“intru[ded] into the function of editors” by compelling them “to publish that which 
‘reason’ tells them should not be published.” Id. at 257-58.  
Observing that “[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit 
for news, comment, and advertising,” the Court held that “[t]he choice of material 
to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and 
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content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—whether 
fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Id. at 258. 
In his concurrence, Justice White underscored that “the very nerve center of a 
newspaper,” is “the decision as to what copy will or will not be included,” and that 
the First Amendment prohibits the government from dictating “the contents of [a 
newspaper’s] news columns or the slant of its editorials.” Id. at 259-61 (White, J., 
concurring); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 124 (1973) (“editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and 
choice of material”).  
Since Tornillo, the Court has held that the First Amendment protects the 
exercise of editorial judgment in other contexts, and by other kinds of actors. For 
example, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 
475 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court considered a state rule that required a public utility to 
include a third party’s opposing views in the utility’s billing envelopes. Id. at 5-7.3 
The state imposed the rule after finding that the utility’s customers “‘will benefit . . . 
from exposure to a variety of views.’” Id. at 6 (quoting public utilities commission). 
The Court invalidated the rule, however, concluding that it impermissibly interfered 
with the utility’s editorial judgment by requiring it to disseminate views opposed to 
 
3 The billing envelopes already included the utility’s own newsletter, which the 
Court treated as equivalent to a small newspaper. Id. at 5, 8. 
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its own, which in turn forced the utility to respond in order to counter those views 
and avoid any impression that the utility agreed with them. Id. at 14-16. As the Court 
made clear, “[t]hat kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion that 
the First Amendment seeks to foster.” Id. at 16. 
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 661 
(1994), the Court considered must-carry provisions that required cable operators to 
carry a set number of local broadcast stations. Congress enacted the provisions in 
order to “correct [a] competitive imbalance” between cable and broadcast television 
that was “endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to 
compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues.” Id. at 
633. Invoking Tornillo, the Court held that a cable operator “exercis[es] editorial 
discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire.” Id. at 636. 
While the Court ultimately upheld the must-carry provisions, as discussed further 
below, it did so only after recognizing that the “provisions interfere[d] with cable 
operators’ editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain 
minimum number of broadcast stations.” Id. at 643-44. 
The Supreme Court’s nearly contemporaneous decision in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), 
conferred First Amendment protection on yet another form of editorial judgment. In 
Hurley, a gay rights group challenged its exclusion from a parade under the state 
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court’s interpretation of Massachusetts’ public accommodations law. Id. at 566. 
There was no dispute that gays and lesbians could participate in the parade as 
members of individual parade units. Id. at 572. The dispute arose because the state 
court applied the public accommodations law to require that the gay rights group be 
admitted “as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.” Id.  
The Court held that the parade organizer exercised editorial judgment in 
excluding the gay rights group, likening the organizer’s selection of participants to 
a newspaper’s selection of news stories and editorials. Id. at 570. The participation 
of the gay rights group in the parade, the Court reasoned, would signify the parade 
organizer’s endorsement of the group’s message, which would alter the parade’s 
expressive content and thus the organizer’s own message to parade spectators. Id. at 
572-75. Invoking Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court explained that “when 
dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately 
connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over 
the message is compromised.” Id. at 576. 
The protection that the Court conferred on editorial judgment in Tornillo, 
Pacific Gas, Turner, and Hurley is vital for more than one reason. Protecting 
editorial discretion in these contexts was a way of recognizing and affirming 
speakers’ autonomy by giving them control over their message. It was also a way of 
protecting public discourse from government intervention that might have distorted 
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democratic self-governance. The regulated entities in these cases were disseminating 
protected expression to broad audiences, and thus were playing an essential role in 
the marketplace of ideas. Protecting editorial discretion in these contexts served 
interests that are at the heart of the First Amendment. 
B. Some of what social media platforms do reflects the exercise of 
editorial judgment—but not all of it does.  
Social media companies exercise editorial discretion in at least two contexts—
when they specify “community standards” that restrict what categories of content 
users can post; and when they remove or attach warning labels to user content.  
When social media companies specify community standards, they make 
decisions roughly analogous to the ones the Supreme Court held to be protected in 
Turner, Hurley, and Pacific Gas. They decide what categories of content will appear 
on their platforms and what categories will not. Their decisions reflect judgments 
about the relative value of those categories of content. And collectively, these 
decisions determine the expressive character of the product they provide to their 
users.4 In Tornillo, the Court observed that “[t]he choice of material to go into a 
newspaper” is at the core of editorial judgment. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258; see also 
 
4 See Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, 1 J. Free 
Speech L. 71, 76 (2021) (observing that social media platforms, like twentieth-
century mass media, “set boundaries on permissible content” and thereby “curate 
public discourse”). 
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id. at 259 (“the decision as to what copy will or will not be included” is “the very 
nerve center of a newspaper”) (White, J., concurring); Ark. Educ. Television Com’n 
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to 
broadcaster’s exclusion of political candidate from debate because excluding 
candidate was in “the nature of editorial discretion”). Here, too, decisions about what 
content to include or exclude are properly characterized as editorial in nature.  
Social media platforms’ attachment of labels to third-party content also 
reflects the exercise of editorial judgment. Platforms deploy these labels for a variety 
of reasons, including to alert users to content that may be disturbing and to flag 
content that platforms believe to be misleading or false.5 Whereas most content 
posted on social media platforms is generated by users, labels are distinctive in that 
they are generated by the platforms themselves.6 They are roughly analogous to 
newspaper editorials, in which newspapers speak directly to matters of public 
concern. As such, they fall comfortably within the scope of “editorial judgment” as 
the Supreme Court has defined the concept. As the Court made clear in Tornillo, 
editorial judgment encompasses the “treatment of public issues,” which the 
 
5 Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating our approach to misleading information, 
Twitter Blog (May 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/9JJ7-JDBM. 
6 E.g., Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Like Common Carriers?, 1 J. Free 
Speech L. 377, 433 (2021) (acknowledging that “posting fact-checks or warnings” 
is platform speech). 
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13 
attachment of warning labels generally is. 418 U.S. at 258. And attaching labels to 
content also reflects decisions about the value of the speech to which the labels are 
attached, just as specifying community standards does. Even if the attachment of a 
warning label did not entail the exercise of editorial judgment, it would still 
constitute speech protected by the First Amendment, for the same reasons that an 
editorial constitutes speech.  
That social media companies’ exercise editorial judgment in these two 
contexts does not mean, of course, that all of their business practices fall within the 
scope of the First Amendment. The relevant inquiry is not whether a regulated entity 
exercises editorial judgment in some context, or even as a general matter, but 
whether the entity exercises editorial judgment in the specific context addressed by 
the regulation.7 Although the case was decided decades before Tornillo, the Supreme 
Court said essentially this in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). There, 
the Court upheld a National Labor Relations Board order directing the Associated 
Press (“AP”) to reinstate an editor fired for his union activity. 301 U.S. at 124. The 
Court rejected the argument that the AP was “immune from regulation because it is 
an agency of the press.” Id. at 131. “The publisher of a newspaper has no special 
 
7 Mailyn Fidler, The New Editors: Refining First Amendment Protections for 
Internet Platforms, 2 Notre Dame L. Sch. J. on Emerging Tech. 241, 243 (2021) 
(“The fact that an internet platform exercises [editorial judgment] at one moment or 
on one part of its site does not mean it does so in all instances.”). 
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immunity from the application of general laws,” the Court wrote, and “has no special 
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.” Id. at 132-33. The Court 
emphasized that the NLRB’s order did not in any way limit the AP’s freedom to 
publish the news as it saw fit, or to enforce editorial policies, such as by firing editors 
who violated those policies. Id. at 133.8 
C. Some laws that implicate editorial judgment are consistent with 
the First Amendment.  
As discussed above, some of the platforms’ activities entail editorial 
judgment. Even regulations that implicate editorial judgment, however, can be 
constitutional in some contexts. Content-based regulations will be constitutional if 
they satisfy strict scrutiny. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (“even 
 
8 The First Amendment also poses no impediment to the regulation of common 
carriers. Such regulation does not implicate the First Amendment because it 
concerns only the “neutral transmission of others’ speech, not a carrier’s 
communication of its own message.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
One prominent First Amendment scholar has suggested that platforms may be 
regulated as common carriers when they host content, but not when they curate 
content, such as the content that platforms arrange in users’ feeds (e.g., Facebook’s 
News Feed). Volokh, supra at 408-09. He argues that hosting content does not 
implicate platforms’ First Amendment rights but that curating content does. Id. 
Whatever arguments the Court addresses in this case, the Court need not address this 
one. The provisions of the Act concerning user content regulate the full range of 
content curation, not only hosting. In addition, the Act is not a conventional common 
carrier regulation because it lacks “a general requirement to serve all comers.” Biden 
v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1222 (2021) (Mem.) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
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when we consider a regulation . . . that is subject to ‘strict scrutiny,’ we sometimes 
find the regulation to be constitutional after weighing the competing interests 
involved.”). And content-neutral laws will be constitutional if they satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny. Content-neutral laws are reviewed less stringently because 
they “do not pose the same inherent dangers to free expression, and thus are subject 
to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Government latitude in designing a 
regulatory solution.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 213 
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Tornillo, Pacific Gas, and Hurley show that content-based laws that interfere 
with editorial judgment are subject to strict scrutiny. The right-of-reply statute in 
Tornillo was content-based because it “was triggered by a particular category of 
newspaper speech,” and awarded access “only to those who disagreed with the 
newspaper’s views.” Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 13. Although the forced-access rule in 
Pacific Gas was not triggered by any speech of the utility, the Court found that it 
was nonetheless content-based because it provided access only to a third party with 
opposing views. Id. at 12-14. The Court in Hurley did not expressly state that it was 
applying strict scrutiny, but it suggested as much by emphasizing that the parade 
organizer, like the newspaper in Tornillo and the utility in Pacific Gas, was forced 
to “disseminat[e] a view contrary to [its] own,” which “compromised” its “right to 
autonomy over [its] message.” Id. at 576.  
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In Turner, by contrast, the Court applied only intermediate scrutiny because 
it concluded that the challenged provisions were content-neutral. In that case, again, 
the Supreme Court considered provisions that required cable operators to carry local 
broadcast stations. The Court concluded that the provisions burdened the cable 
operators’ exercise of editorial judgment but upheld them anyway. It did so after 
concluding that the “overriding objective … was not to favor programming of a 
particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free 
television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable.” Turner I, 
512 U.S. at 646.  
The Court expressly rejected the cable operators’ argument that Tornillo and 
Pacific Gas required strict scrutiny because the must-carry provisions compelled the 
“operators to transmit speech not of their choosing.” Id. at 653. The Court explained 
that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral, unlike the regulations at issue 
in Tornillo and Pacific Gas, because they were not triggered “by any particular 
message spoken by cable operators,” and they were not an attempt to 
“counterbalance the messages” of the regulated entity. Id. at 655. The Court also 
noted that cable operators would not need to alter their own messages to disavow the 
content of broadcasts, because cable operators’ subscribers would not associate 
those companies with the content of broadcast channels in the first place. Id.  
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In distinguishing Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court also emphasized a key 
technological difference between newspapers and cable television. Unlike 
newspapers, the Court noted, cable had “bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control” over the 
content delivered to subscribers by virtue of “the physical connection between the 
television set and the cable network.” Id. at 656. Because this “bottleneck monopoly 
power . . . over a central avenue of communication” could be abused, the Court 
concluded that the First Amendment does not prevent the government from “tak[ing] 
steps to ensure . . . the free flow of information and ideas.” Id. at 657, 661.  
Having concluded that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral, the 
Court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the provisions. Turner II, 520 U.S. 
180. The Court found that the provisions were “designed to address a real harm”—
the likelihood that the 40 percent of Americans without cable would be deprived of 
access to broadcast television. Id. at 195. These households relied on over-the-air 
broadcast stations as their sole source of television programming, and competition 
from the cable industry—including cable operators’ decisions to drop broadcast 
stations from their repertoire—threatened broadcasters’ continued access to an 
audience and advertising revenues, and thus threatened their very existence. Id. at 
190-213. The Court found that the must-carry provisions alleviated this harm 
because the provisions “ensured that a number of local broadcasters retain[ed] cable 
carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising revenues needed to 
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support a multiplicity of stations.” Id. at 213. As to narrow tailoring, the Court found 
that Congress took steps to lessen the must-carry provisions’ burden on cable 
operators, and concluded that “the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the 
benefits it affords.” Id. at 215-16. 
D. The analogy of social media companies to newspapers is helpful 
only to a point.  
Social media platforms are like newspapers in that some of their activities 
involve the exercise of editorial judgment. But social media platforms are different 
from newspapers in important ways. In any particular context, those differences 
might matter to whether a particular activity entails the exercise of editorial 
judgment, how significantly a regulation burdens that judgment, and the strength of 
the government’s interest in imposing the burden.9 As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, “each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment 
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.” Se. 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 
535 U.S. 564, 595 (2002) (“The economics and the technology of each medium 
affect both the burden of a speech restriction and the Government’s interest in 
maintaining it.”).  
 
9 See generally Heather Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial 
Analogy, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/C4DY-4W7G. 
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Social media platforms differ from newspapers in the following ways, among 
others:  
First, whereas newspapers are comprised mainly of content they themselves 
create or specifically solicit, most content posted on social media platforms is 
generated by the platforms’ users.10 Newspapers are highly selective in what they 
publish; they exercise close curatorial control over their pages. Social media 
companies have community standards that place broad limits on what content can 
be published on their platforms, but within these limits—and to a significant extent 
outside them due to imperfect enforcement—they publish virtually everything that 
users submit to them. All of this means that newspapers are directly and intimately 
engaged with the content they publish in a way that social media platforms are not.  
Second, there is an incredible disparity in scale between newspapers and 
social media platforms. The New York Times online edition “publishes roughly 150 
articles a day.”11 Over the same period, Facebook users share more than 1 billion 
stories and 100 billion messages.12 This disparity exists because platforms and 
newspapers have different business models; because to some extent they use 
 
10 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1660 (2018). 
11 Robinson Meyer, How Many Stories Do Newspapers Publish Per Day? The 
Atlantic (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q6TQ-GEHE. 
12 Meta, Who We Are: Company Info, https://perma.cc/2WFD-Z9KV. 
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different media; and because they operate under different legal regimes (or, perhaps 
more accurately, because they benefit to different extents from the same legal 
regime). See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (immunizing online services from civil liability for 
content posted by third parties).  
Third, newspapers are coherent speech products in a way that social media 
platforms are not. By affirmatively selecting the subjects and viewpoints that will 
make it into the paper, newspapers communicate their own message to readers by 
“combining multifarious voices.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.13 Most social media 
platforms are not coherent speech products because they are not curated in the same 
granular way, and because they are simply too sprawling, diverse, and incoherent (in 
the literal sense of the word) to be understandable as single expressive products. 
Again, social media companies do set community standards that delineate the outer 
boundaries of permissible speech on their platforms, and they do enforce these 
community standards to one extent or another. But specifying and enforcing 
community standards is not the same thing as selecting individual articles, and it 
does not have the same results. This is why newspapers’ readers tend to attribute 
 
13 See also Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search 
Engine Speech, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1629, 1651 (2014) (describing newspapers as 
producing “an integrated expressive whole with which [the newspaper] is 
associated.”); Volokh, supra at 405 (describing newspapers as providing a “coherent 
speech product”). 
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newspapers’ content to the newspapers’ publishers, whereas platforms’ users do not 
generally attribute the content on the platforms to the platforms’ owners.14  
Fourth, newspapers generally do not remove content once it has been 
published, whereas removing content after publication is a major part of social media 
platforms’ operations. Newspapers do issue corrections and editors’ notes, but they 
almost never take down content once it is published.15 Social media companies 
devote immense resources to after-the-fact removal of content that violates their 
community standards. Indeed, Facebook apparently employs 15,000 content 
moderators, who review 3 million pieces of content each day to determine if any 
should be removed.16 
Finally, newspapers rely mainly on human decision-making in order to 
moderate and curate content, whereas social media companies increasingly rely on 
 
14 Bracha, supra at 1647-48; Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t the Use of 
Analogies but the Analogies Courts Use, Knight First Amendment Institute at 
Columbia University Blog (Feb. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/WDT7-EY4J; Ramya 
Krishnan, The Pitfalls of Platform Analogies in Reconsidering the Shape of the First 
Amendment, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University Blog (May 
19, 2021), https://perma.cc/QHD8-7JLS. 
15 Rogene Jacquette, We Stand Corrected: How The Times Handles Errors, N.Y. 
Times (June 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/VY25-P5RP.  
16 John Koetsier, Report: Facebook Makes 300,000 Content Moderation Mistakes 
Every Day, Forbes (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/06/09/300000-facebook-content-
moderation-mistakes-daily-report-says/?sh=d3fdd854d03d.  
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machine-learning algorithms that are generally opaque even to their creators.17 As a 
consequence, newspapers’ decisions are explainable in a way that platforms’ 
decisions often are not.18  
* * * * * 
These differences between social media companies and newspapers should 
inform any First Amendment analysis. Some regulations that would burden editorial 
judgment if imposed on newspapers might not burden editorial judgment if imposed 
on social media companies. Even regulations that would burden social media 
companies’ editorial judgment might not burden that judgment to the same extent as 
they would burden newspapers’ editorial judgment if the regulations were imposed 
on them. And the government may have different reasons, and perhaps stronger 
ones, for imposing certain kinds of regulatory burdens on social media companies. 
The analogy of social media companies to newspapers is helpful—but only to a 
 
17 Deepa Seetharaman, The Facebook Files: Facebook Says AI Will Clean Up the 
Platform. Its Own Engineers Have Doubts, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 17, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/PCM8-BJD8; Lawrence Lessig, The First Amendment Does Not 
Protect Replicants, Harv. Public Law Working Paper No. 21-34 (September 10, 
2021), https://perma.cc/B29P-ATS2. 
18 E.g., Anna Kramer, Twitter’s own research shows that it’s a megaphone for the 
right. But it’s complicated, Protocol (Oct. 21, 2021) (“When algorithms get put out 
into the world, what happens when people interact with it, we can’t model for that. 
We can’t model for how individuals or groups of people will use Twitter, what will 
happen in the world in a way that will impact how people use Twitter”), 
https://perma.cc/4BZT-CKW4.  
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point. The similarities between platforms and newspapers are important, but, in any 
particular context, the differences might be important, too.19  
E. Construing platforms’ rights too broadly would impede 
government from enacting laws that would serve First 
Amendment values.  
The protection that the Supreme Court has afforded to editorial judgment is 
essential to our society. It recognizes and affirms the expressive autonomy of 
individual speakers. It also serves as a crucial bulwark against government efforts to 
distort and control public discourse—as this case reminds us. But giving editorial 
judgment too broad a scope, or shielding it altogether from regulatory burden, would 
be a mistake, especially in an era in which so much speech that is essential to our 
democracy takes place on private platforms. Indeed, doing so would undermine 
interests that the First Amendment was intended to protect.  
For example, it would make it exceedingly difficult for the government to 
address the challenges identified below, even through regulation that is carefully 
drawn and sensitive to First Amendment interests: 
Platform transparency. Social media platforms shape public discourse in a 
variety of ways—including through their design choices, their community standards 
and enforcement, and their content curation, including the algorithmic prioritization 
 
19 See generally Whitney, supra. 
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and deprioritization of user-generated content.20 Public understanding of how 
platforms are shaping public discourse is very limited, however, for multiple 
reasons. Platforms have declined to share information with researchers and the 
public.21 Some platforms have leveraged their terms of service to interfere with 
journalists and researchers who study issues like misinformation and discrimination 
online.22 And because they rely on machine-learning algorithms that are black boxes 
even to the engineers who designed them, the social media companies themselves 
do not fully understand how their platforms work.23  
In response to all of this, researchers, advocates, and regulators have proposed 
that the platforms be required to share certain categories of information with 
credentialed researchers or the public.24 The Knight Institute has proposed that 
 
20 See generally Jameel Jaffer & Katy Glenn Bass, Opinion, Facebook’s ‘Supreme 
Court’ Faces Its First Major Test, N.Y. Times (Feb. 17, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/27K9-LPS2. 
21 Laura Edelson, Opinion, How Facebook Hinders Misinformation Research, 
Scientific American (Sept. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/6V2Y-AGQ8. 
22 Charlie Savage, Facebook Is Asked to Change Rules for Journalists and 
Scholars, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/BP3M-U4CN. 
23 Kramer, supra. 
24 See, e.g., The Disinformation Black Box: Researching Social Media Data: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. 
Sci., Space, and Tech. (2021) (statement of Laura Edelson, NYU Cybersecurity for 
Democracy), https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Edelson%20Testimony.pdf; 
Shirin Ghaffary, How to fix Facebook: Can Facebook be redeemed? Twelve leading 
experts share bold solutions to the company’s urgent problems, Vox (Nov. 8, 2021) 
(interview with Professor Nathaniel Persily), https://perma.cc/YA54-NZG7. 
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Congress create a legal safe harbor that would protect certain kinds of journalism 
and research from interference by the platforms.25 Whether these proposals are 
sensible, go too far, or fail to go far enough can be debated, of course. An overbroad 
understanding of “editorial judgment,” however, would render this debate entirely 
academic, because it would turn the First Amendment into a major obstacle to all of 
these proposals. It would mandate the application of strict scrutiny where 
intermediate scrutiny would be more appropriate. And it would mean that 
regulations that might otherwise survive constitutional scrutiny would fail it instead. 
Due process. When the government excludes a person from a traditional 
public forum, like a school board meeting, it must explain why, and it must afford 
the person an opportunity to challenge the exclusion. The same is true when the 
government excludes a person from a social media account used for official 
purposes. When a social media company excludes a user from its platform, by 
contrast, it is not legally obliged to provide notice or an opportunity to be heard.26 
Some scholars and legislators have proposed that platforms should be required to 
provide users with due process, because being excluded from major social media 
 
25 Ramya Krishnan & Alex Abdo, How Do You Solve A Problem Like Facebook?, 
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University Blog (Oct. 14, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/MAG5-RJEJ. 
26 See Oversight Board, Oversight Board demands more transparency from 
Facebook (Oct. 2021), https://perma.cc/T4N7-R98K. 
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platforms means being excluded from a large part of public discourse.27 Here, too, 
there is room for debate about exactly what kinds of obligations should be imposed 
on platforms—and Plaintiffs make a strong argument that the burdens associated 
with the due process provisions of the Florida law are disproportionate in relation to 
the government’s asserted justification for them. But even if Plaintiffs are correct, it 
is important to recognize that due process protections might be implemented in other 
ways, including in ways that are less burdensome. An overbroad conception of 
editorial judgment, or an insistence that editorial judgment must be categorically 
immunized from regulatory burden, or an unqualified endorsement of the equation 
between platforms and newspapers, would render the whole debate beside the point. 
It would make it nearly impossible for governments to establish due process 
protections that are important to free speech online. 
Privacy. Social media platforms collect staggeringly large amounts of 
sensitive information about their users—and, indeed, about their non-users as well. 
They use this information to target online advertisements and other content to 
individual users.28 Targeting and “micro-targeting” can create echo chambers in 
which misinformation and conspiracy theories sometimes flourish. It can also have 
 
27 Volokh, supra at 403; Balkin, supra at 85; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms 
Have Editorial Rights?, 1 J. Free Speech L. 97, 126 (2021). 
28 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses 
Your Data, N.Y. Times (April 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/3CJ6-HFF3. 
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the effect of insulating speech from counterspeech and correction, effectively 
undermining a process that the First Amendment was meant to safeguard. See 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney 
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Scholars, 
advocates, and others have proposed that legislatures restrict what platforms can 
collect about their users, and limit how the information they collect can be used.29 
But the same is true in this context as is true in the two contexts addressed above: an 
overly sweeping conception of platforms’ First Amendment rights would preempt 
this legislative debate. It would disable legislatures from enacting laws that may be 
important to protecting free speech online. 
* * * * * 
It is worth emphasizing again that the protection the courts have accorded to 
editorial discretion is essential. This protection has limits, however, and these limits 
help ensure that the protection serves, rather than undermines, First Amendment 
interests. The Court should not interpret the First Amendment in a way that would 
preclude legislatures from enacting carefully drawn laws, sensitive to First 
Amendment interests, that may be necessary to protect free speech online.  
 
29 Farhad Manjoo, Opinion: OK, but What Should We Actually Do About 
Facebook? I Asked the Experts, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/3GSD-
WB72. 




For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges this Court to affirm. 
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